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The provisions of the antitrust laws are sometimes characterized as
quasi-Constitutional. If by this it is meant that the statutory language is
vague and commends itself to varying interpretations, I am sure that
many would find the comparison to the United States Constitution to be
apt. However, I suppose that the comparison springs from a deeper source
-that is, from the assumption that faith in the beneficent effects of free
and open competition is, like the essential teachings of the Constitution,
at the very heart of our concept of what makes American society function.
But, even if the federal antitrust laws be taken to set forth a fundamental
charter of the competitive faith,' the vision of their constitutional role
may mislead us. These laws, unlike the Constitution, are not the apex,
but only a co-ordinate part of, "the supreme law of the land."'  We
have been constantly faced with the problem of reconciling antitrust
dictates with other governmental policies on the national, state and local
levels in which considerations of competition are not paramount. Within
the arena of federal trade regulation itself, courts and the antitrust bar
have long struggled with the difficulties of reconciling the Sherman Act
with other federal statutes, like the Robinson-Patman Act, where the
very opposite of competition sometimes appears to be the keynote.3 For
many special industries, Congress, in its wisdom, has chosen a pattern of
regulation, rather than the blessings of competition under the antitrust
laws. Recently, it has been brought home to us forcibly that the border-
lines between regulation and competition may not be fixed for all time.
Examples of fluidity of these borders would include the unfreezing of
commissions on large transactions on the stock exchanges, antitrust chal-
lenges to exclusive practices by the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASD and proposals for the end of rate regulation by the ICC.4
t The three articles comprising this symposium were presented to the Combined Institute-
Corporate Counsel and Antitrust held at the 91st annual meeting of the Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion, April 30, 1971.-Ed.
* Member of the Ohio Bar. The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the valuable
research assistance of his associate, David G. Heiman, in connection with the preparation of
this article.
INorthern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
2 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. CCH TRAI)E REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 5 73,559, at 90,331
(D.C. Cir. April 27, 1971), petition for cert. filed July 23, 1971.
3 For the latest chapter in Judge Zirpoli's effort to reconcile the Sherman Act restriction
on price information exchange with evidentiary requirements under the Robinson-Patman Act's
meeting competition defense, see Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., CCH TRADE REG.
REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 5 73,023 (N.D. Cal. March 18, 1971).
4 With respect to deregulation of transportation rates, see Economic Report of the President,
transmitted to Congress February 1971, pp. 122-130.
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However, recent months have shown that the problem of accommodat-
ing the antitrust rules of free and open competition with other govern-
mental policies are by no means limited to the so-called regulated indus-
tries. Classic antitrust rules of competition required accommodation or
reconciliation with quite different governmental policies in fields as dis-
parate as foreign trade, collective bargaining, lobbying, and anticompet-
itive state action. Moreover, the new consumerist and ecological move-
ments have given a completely new dimension to long-standing arguments
concerning the proper role of voluntary industry action to achieve such
socially-approved goals as fair advertising and ethical business methods,
product safety, and health.
It is far too early to offer any confident prediction as to how the borders
will be drawn between antitrust and other policy considerations in these
developing legal areas. However, one can already note certain character-
istics of antitrust thinking which may require modification if obstacles to
productive accommodation with other policies are to be removed. The
principal means of accommodation appear to be the following:
(1) The consideration of competing public policies as a factor in de-
termining whether a restraint is "reasonable" within the meaning of the
Sherman Act;
(2) The application of legislative or judicial exemptions or immu-
nities from the antitrust laws in the interest of sponsoring other policies;
and
(3) The discretionary expression by governmental agencies of an in-
tention not to proceed against actions which may be within the literal
proscription of the antitrust laws.
All of these means of accommodation appear hampered in many cases by
the "constititional" view of antitrust principles of competition referred to
at the outset. This attitude may carry with it the implication that anti-
trust policies are intrinsically to be preferred to other governmental
considerations, and that accommodations in the direction of such other
policies must either be denied, disguised, or made with great reluctance
and apology. The first of the routes of accommodation mentioned in many
ways appears the most attractive. The determination that a restraint
otherwise illegal may be reasonable if in pursuance of an approved public
policy has the advantage of avoiding the necessity of legislative action
or of the exercise of political or administrative grace. Moreover, unlike
the nolle pros approach to antitrust law, the determination of no liability
under the rule of reason shields affected industry from the danger of pri-
vate treble damage actions. However, this course of accommodation
is often barred by the fact that the very types of business conduct likely
to be involved in pursuing approved social ends may bear at least formal
resemblance to categories which are customarily proclaimed per se viola-
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tions of the antitrust laws, to be condemned regardless of offered justi-
fications.
History is very much with us. The Socony Vacuum decision of 1940,'
in confirming that joint action to fix or stabilize prices was to be treated
as a per se violation, rejected considerations of a purpose allegedly favor-
able to the economy, the removal of "surplus" gasoline from a depressed
market, and also swept aside evidence of knowledge and acquiescence on
the part of officers of the federal government. Few of us would be in-
clined to do fresh battle on the admissibility of legal justification for price
fixing. However, the traditional models of per se or virtually per se cate-
gories include many other types of conduct which may well merit legal
reassessment when other public policies are involved. We are told, for
example, by the Container Corporation case 6 that the exchange of price
information between competitors may be illegal in the absence of price
agreement. Traditional antitrust doctrines also proscribe, with no or little
room for justification, agreements among competitors on costs or ele-
ments of costs which may have a material effect on prices; on agree-
ments to enforce standards or to exclude competitors; and on agreements
to limit technological developments or to withhold products from the
market. It is interesting to see how business activities in these traditional
proscribed categories have fared recently, when other legal or social pol-
icies have been at play.
II. JOINT NEGOTIATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
In early 1971 we have seen what appears to have been a perfectly
appropriate modification of traditional antitrust bans on joint cost negotia-
tions by competitors with suppliers in the interest of more significant
policies of foreign trade and diplomacy. I refer to the apparent approval
by the federal government of the co-ordinated bargaining by oil com-
panies of the United States and other Western companies with member
Governments of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). The negotiations conducted first with the Persian Gulf States
and more recently with Libya centered on the oil-producing countries'
desire to increase the rates of oil taxes and royalties and the so-called
"posted prices" of oil which provide the tax and royalty base and have
only an indirect relation to market prices." There was a variety of reasons
why it was in the interest of the United States not to cling to the anti-
trust dogma that each oil company bargain its tax and royalty cost sepa-
rately. The Libyan Government plainly had set out to whipsaw the in-
GUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
OUnited States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). But see Wall Prod-
ucts Co. v. National Gypsum Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1971 Trade Cas.) 5 73,023 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 18, 1971).
7 Fortune, March 1971, at 30.
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dividual companies into an expensive settlement by separate negotia-
tions.8  Moreover, likely alternatives to successful joint bargaining were
"acts of state" which would in any event have been beyond the reach of
our laws. Threats of governmental cut-off of oil production and of expro-
priation had been made.9 Further, if negotiations failed, the oil coun-
tries could have worked their will by tax increase through legislation, as
the Shah of Iran had said his country would do, and as Venezuela had al-
ready done.' 0 The shoring up of the oil companies' bargaining position
also may have had political significance. The Libyan Government had in-
dicated that its tough bargaining stance was intended to put pressure on
our diplomatic position in the Middle East." The concern of the Admin-
istration for the fate of the negotiations was reflected by President Nixon's
decision to send Under Secretary of State, John N. Irwin II, on a visit in
January to Iran and other oil-producing countries.' 2
In view of the fact that the joint bargaining by the oil companies
hardly seems controversial, it is surprising how the Government chose
to cloak its blessings in mystery. Many references were made in the press
to approval of the co-ordinated bargaining by the United States Govern-
ment." We also read that the Antitrust Division showed a favorable
"business review letter" to the oil companies on January 15 but refused
to give them a copy because of "diplomatic complications."' 4  Later the
companies referred to their receipt of a "routine business review letter"
but took pains to deny "any allegation that the oil companies have been
granted a waiver of immunity from the antitrust laws."'15 Finally, in
March publicity was given to an exchange of correspondence between
Senator Proxmire and Antitrust Division Chief Richard McLaren regard-
ing the oil companies' joint action.'> Senator Proxmire was concerned
about a report that the oil companies had agreed to a pooling arrange-
ment in the event Libyan oil was shut off. Mr. McLaren, while confirm-
ing the absence of power in the Department of Justice to grant immunity
for violations of the antitrust laws, commented that neither the anti-
trust laws nor the Standard Oil decree of 196017 barring allocation of oil
production prohibited concerted action by the oil companies to assure that
the group approach of the producing countries would not work to the
greater prejudice of some competitors than others. Mr. McLaren's re-
8 N.Y. Times, January 29,1971, at 6, col. 4.
9 Id.; N.Y. Times, January 25, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
10 Fortune, March 1971, at 30; N.Y. Times, January 25, 1971, at 12, col. 3.
11 N.Y. Times, January 27, 1971, at 10, col. 4.
12 N.Y. Times, January 18, 1971, at 5, col. 5.
13 E.g., N.Y. Times, January 21,1971, at 11, col. 4.
14 496 BNA ANITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORTS, A-1 (1971).
15 Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1971, at 4, col. 4.
16 509 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 8 (1971).
17United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1960 Trade Cas. 5 69,849. (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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sponse did not disclose any details with respect to the pooling agreement.
However, to the extent his letter was confirmation of his approval of the
joint bargaining, it was a sound denouement, surely, to months of mys-
tery, but was the mystery necessary ?18
III. COLLECTVE BARGAINING
The OPEC negotiations demonstrate that one exception to the ban on
joint action by competitors to determine their costs may be carved out
where the costs are royalties or taxes to foreign governments. Another
exception, though its limits are not fully defined, is made where the costs
are labor costs. If the costs in issue were material costs, one would have
little difficulty in determining that a joint agreement by purchasers to
require the supplier to charge a uniform price would be illegal. When
the supplier is a labor union, antitrust policy and the labor laws must
hammer out their respective jurisdictions. Extremist solutions in either
direction are logically possible. The antitrust purist could urge that an
anticompetitive purpose plus joint business action are sufficient to make
out a violation even in the context of labor negotiations. The collective
bargaining advocate could counter that once it is conceded that wages are
the central subject of collective bargaining the motive of a wage agree-
ment reached by such bargaining is not subject to examination. The Su-
preme Court appears to have steered a middle course. The Court seems
to withhold the antitrust hand from anticompetitive possibilities within
the bargaining unit while permitting broad consideration of anticompet-
itive purposes when the restraint is directed outside the unit. In United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,9 the Court considered a claim
that the Sherman Act was applicable to an alleged agreement between a
union and large mining companies included in a multi-employer bar-
gaining unit that the union would impose the agreed-upon wage and royal-
ty scales upon smaller operators for the purpose of eliminating their com-
petition. The Court observed that, by virtue of the labor exemption
from the antitrust laws,20 no antitrust case could be premised on a union's
negotiation of a wage agreement with a multi-employer bargaining unit,
or upon its unilateral decision to seek the same wages from other em-
ployers. The Court held, however, that the labor exemption is forfeited
when it is shown that a union agreed with one set of employers to im-
18A counterpart of the OPEC situation was presented by the voluntary agreement of the
Japanese textile industry, with the backing of the Japanese Government, to restrict imports into
the United States. It was suggested in April 1971 that United States importers carrying out the
plan could be attacked under the United States antitrust laws despite the "tacit" agreement of
Representative Wilbur D. Mills. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1971, at 59, col. 2.
10 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
20 Clayton Antitrust Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964); §§ 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964), Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1964).
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pose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.2 ' The proper in-
ference from Pennington's holding that the labor exemption is forfeited
when union-employer restraints are imposed outside the unit appears to
be that antitrust assessment of behavior within the unit is precluded.
This view would apparently hold even if there were evidence that certain
dominant members of the unit had agreed with the union to impose a
particular wage settlement on the unit for anticompetitive purposes. The
justification for applying immunity within the multi-employer unit
would presumably be that the appropriateness of such a unit is determined
by the NLRB in certification procedures. However, the NLRB, in de-
termining whether a multi-employer group is an appropriate bargaining
unit, considers whether the members will regard the group's negotiations
as binding2 and does not determine whether certain members of the
group will be likely to seek, with union aid, to impose certain settlement
terms on weaker employers.
When a conspiratorial wage scale is imposed outside the unit, usual
antitrust standards of proof of anticompetitive intent apply. In Ramsey
v. United Mine Workers of America,23 the Supreme Court has held that,
in analyzing charges of antitrust liability for imposition of wage scales
outside the original unit as a result of union-employer agreement, the
Norris-La Guardia Act's requirement of dear proof24 does not apply to
proof of the substantive antitrust violation but only to proof of union au-
thorization of the unlawful acts.
In the South-East Coal case, in which certiorari has recently been
denied,25 defendants unsuccessfully sought to limit the effect of Penning-
ton by arguing that the Supreme Court had merely held that the im-
position of conspiratorial wage restraints outside the bargaining unit
causes a loss of the labor exemption but had not decided that such re-
straints cause antitrust liability to follow as a matter of course. The Court
of Appeals in South-East Coal appeared to find a per se violation.2
2 1 Subsequently the trial court held that proof of the alleged union-employer conspiracy had
been insufficient. Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), aft'd, 400 F.2d
806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968). In another case concerning the same
history of labor negotiations, a jury verdict finding an agreement to impose the terms of the
coal contract upon nonsignatories has been upheld. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d 1191 (6th Cir. 1969).
22 E.g., Quality Limestone Products, Inc., 1963 CCH NLRB Decisions 5 12,445
23 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
24 Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964).
25 South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidated Coal Co., (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983
(1971).
26 It is interesting to note that the Pennington distinction between restraints internal and
external to the bargaining unit was sufficiently confusing to the trial court as to cause its jury
instructions to become garbled. The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge "misspoke"
in instructing the jury that the loss of the antitrust exemption flowed from an agreement to im-
pose a wage scale "on the bargaining unit"; it said the trial judge meant to say "on other bar-
gaining units." 434 F.2d 767, 776 n.9. (6th Cir. 1970).
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It should be observed that, in contexts other than multi-employer bar-
gaining, wage rates are treated by antitrust authorities much like other
costs substantially affecting price. Thus, the Federal Trade Commission
in an advisory opinion, while advising a dairy trade association that it
would not object to a plan for the exchange of wage contracts, suggested
that the plan be used with care "because an agreement among competi-
tors as to wage rates would be illegal, since it would have the effect of
fixing the price of milk. 27
IV. CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION
The rival claims of antitrust policy and other national concerns are
currently being highlighted in the field of consumer and environmental
protection. The air in this field is now heavy not only with pollutants
but with rhetoric. Some are apparently contending that for our waters to
be clean the antitrust laws must be done away with along with the phos-
phates, while others fear that the United States economy is just about
to be cartelized in the name of ecology and safety. In the early pro-
nouncements, the FTC and the Antitrust Division do not seem completely
at one, with the Commission avowing considerable interest in the benefits
of industry self-regulation as a supplement to its limited enforcement
personnel28 and the Antitrust Division tending to stand a bit more aloof.29
However, when one pierces the mists of this dialogue, signs of remarkable
progress appear in the direction of thinking out, and in some areas work-
ing out, the respective claims of antitrust and consumer and environmental
programs.
Some aid to analysis of developments may be provided by subdividing
the possible types of joint action by competitors in the interest of con-
sumerism and ecology:
(1) responsible advertising and product information;
27 162 FTC Advisory Opinion Digest (1968).
2 8 E.g., speech of Chairman Kirkpatrick before the Antitrust Law Section of the New
York State Bar Association, January 28, 1971. However, Chairman Kirkpatrick continues to
warn that self-regulation and its enforcement may conflict with the antitrust laws. N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1971, at 44, col. 3. In a recent speech, Basil Mezines, Executive Director of the Com-
mission, while suggesting standards for self-regulation, has warned that self-regulation cannot
replace law enforcement or business conscience. 527 BNA ANITRuSr AND TRADE REG.
REP. A-2 to 3 (1971). The FTC in late 1971 announced its policy of compliance with the re-
quirements of the National Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (Supp. 1971). The
Commission will prepare statements concerning the environmental impact of its proposed rules
and guides and its legislative proposals. However, this policy will not apply to investigations
made for enforcement purposes or to adjudicatory proceedings. 541 B.N.A. ANTITRuST AND
REG. REP. A-23 (1971).
20 Speech of Antitrust Division Chief Richard W. McLaren to the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association, April 1, 1971. Virginia H. Knauer, the Presidentes Special Assis-
tant for Consumer Affairs, has also joined the ranks of those skeptical of the benefits of self-
regulation, in her attack on the proposed program for advertisers drafted by the Council of
Better Business Bureaus. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1971, at 37, col. 1.
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW IOURNAL
(2) joint research on anti-pollution and safety devices;
(3) product standardization and certification;
(4) elimination of unsafe or unhealthy products.
A. Advertising
A good deal of joint action in advertising and product information
appears feasible without undue antitrust risk. And the Government, de-
spite the songs of antitrust orthodoxy which are still heard throughout
the land, does not appear to be above considerable "jawboning" to in-
duce voluntary agreements on advertising which are in the interest of
public health or safety. In April, 1971, seven of the country's nine ciga-
rette manufacturers, after conferences with the FTC and members of
Congress, agreed to include a health warning in advertisements of their
productsf 0  This agreement can only be regarded as restrictive of compe-
tition in the sense that it deprives the parties to the agreement of the
competitive tool of inducing sales by suppressing caution as to the hazards
inherent in the product-hardly competitive impairment which should be
regarded as an "unreasonable restraint." Actually, a much more sub-
stantial competitive restraint by voluntary action of the cigarette com-
panies has been imposed in the past-their agreement to restrict appeal
to the youth market by ending on-campus solicitation, etc. And in the
Code of the National Association of Broadcasters, antitrust authorities
have tolerated, possibly because of some measure of supervision by the
FCC, voluntary agreements which resemble the "boycott" pattern, such
as the agreement not to broadcast liquor advertisements.1
In the related area of product information, a significant recent devel-
opment in behalf of the consumer has been the endorsement by major
meat processors of a plan of the American Meat Institute to standardize
date coding on packaged meats.32
B. Joint research
We are hearing discordant voices on the issue of the desirability of
permitting joint research by competitors to develop product and environ-
mental protection devices. The issue was clearly joined at the spring
1971 meeting of the Antitrust Section. Mr. McLaren asserted that "it is
30 N.Y. Times, April 16, 1971, at 26, col. 1. It was later announced that the FTC was dis-
satisfied with these agreements and would seek to require health-hazard warnings. Wall Street
Journal, June 21, 1971, at 10, col. 5.
al Levin, The Limits of Self-Regulation, 67 CoLuM. L. REV. 604 (1967). One method
which has been used by a self-regulatory group to avoid boycott charges has been to induce
Governmental participation in enforcement. Recently, the National Swimming Pool Institute
coupled its public warning against certain sales practices with the statement that it was working
with legal authorities in several states in an effort to stop deceptive selling. Wall Street Journal,
April 23, 1971, at 5, col. 3.
32 Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1971, at 2, col. 4.
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the abiding faith of the Antitrust Division that the preservation of com-
petitive alternatives promises society the most expeditious development of
safer, better quality, and cleaner products." On the other hand, Mr.
Alan G. Kirk II, Deputy Counsel for the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), expressed doubt as to whether all technological problems are
best hammered out on the forge of unrestrained competition. He ques-
tioned whether the Apollo program could have proceeded on such a basis.
It is not possible to sit in early judgment on this controversy. But a
few preliminary observations can be offered to clarify the dispute.
Joint research by competitors is not illegal per se under the antitrust
laws. Illegality may be premised on a finding that the research venture
excludes outsiders from the fruits of competitively significant technologi-
cal development; discourages independent innovation by participants; or
leads competitors into collusive behavior in areas unrelated to the research
project. Needless to say, a joint research activity may not be used as a
cover to delay and obstruct the development of product improvements as
the Justice Department charged that the automobile manufacturers and
their trade association were doing in the field of pollution control, in a
1969 complaint terminated by a consent decree.33
It cannot be said that the Antitrust Division's concern with respect
to joint research activity in pollution and safety devices is frivolous.
Many of the industries centrally involved in the environmental and safety
crises are oligopolies led by financially strong companies. In these in-
dustries there is reason both to assume the existence of financial capability
for significant independent product development and to abstain from any
permissiveness which might encourage collusion.
But even in concentrated industries there may be room for informed
governmental judgment that a joint technological program may be pref-
erable to parallel efforts. Recently the Justice Department has announced
that it will not object to the extension of an agreement (excepted during
its original term from the scope of the 1969 consent decree) under
which General Motors is furnishing American Motors technical help on
certain automobile emission control projects.3 4  However, this decision
was apparently based on the comparatively weak competitive position of
American Motors. On the broader issue of antitrust exemption for the
automotive industry generally a strident debate continues. Senator
Robert P. Griffin has introduced a bill providing an antitrust exemption
for joint research by automotive manufacturers for the purpose of meeting
or exceeding air pollution standards.3 The bill has been supported by
UAW President Leonard Woodcock, who has urged even broader exemp-
33 United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn., 1969 Trade Cas. 5 72,907 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
34 Wall Street Journal, June 7, 1971, at 5, col. 4; May 26, 1971, at 4, col. 2.
35 S. 2258, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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tion for research efforts to meet automobile safety standards as well as
pollution standards.3 On the other hand, the Antitrust Division, in
responding to a request of the Department of Transportation to outline
the antitrust implications of intercompany technical exchanges in the de-
velopment of vehicle safety devices, has favored independent research ef-
forts.3 7  Ralph Nader, joining the debate, has voiced strong opposition
to the Griffin Bill, fearing a "spill-over of non-competition" into other
areas. 
3 8
The Government's flexibility in permitting technical assistance to Amer-
ican Motors gives us some reason to hope that in other industries where
firms are smaller and competition is more vigorous, joint action in re-
search may in proper cases be given governmental encouragement even
at the expense of some traditional antitrust concerns. Such a policy
would be supportable if our national priorities are so reordered that safety
and health are placed in equal ranking with the acts which we justify
in the name of "national defense." In this connection, it should be noted
that as recently as December, 1969 the Defense Production Act of 19503'
was amended to broaden the antitrust exemption for voluntary agree-
ments and programs made with the approval of the President to further
the objectives of the Act.
C. Product standardization and certification
In this area the most important recent development is the response of
the FTC, on March 22, 1971, to the request of the American National
Standards Institute, Inc., for an advisory opinion with respect to a proposed
certification program.40 The FTC declined to issue an opinion because
of the complexity of legal criteria, the uncertainty of court decisions,
and the impossibility of making an informed decision in the absence of
intensive investigation and collateral inquiry. However, the Commission
further advised that, in order to assist in exploring the possibility of
self-regulation through standard certification, it had directed its staff to
commence a study to determine whether it is possible for the Commission
to make a meaningful contribution to the development of a satisfactory
and legal program. The Commission, pending such study, listed 16 cri-
teria which must be considered in an evaluation of any program of self-
regulation. These criteria, incorporating points made by Mr. McLaren
and Chairman Kirkpatrick in previous speeches, include the following (as
summarized in compressed form):
86 528 TRADE REG. REP. 8 (1971).
37 530 TRADE REG. REP. 7 (1971).
38 526 BNA ANTrmusT AND TRADE REG. REP. A-15 (1971).
39 Defense Production Act of 1950 § 708, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2158 (1950).
40 5 TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,549, at 21,621 (1971).
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(1) Standardization and certification programs must not be used to
fix prices or lessen competition or have the effect of boycotting or exclud-
ing competitors or controlling production or (except when clearly required
by safety) reducing kinds or sizes of products available.
(2) Performance standards must be used when possible, instead
of standards as to product construction or specification.
(3) Standards must be kept current to reflect technological change.
(4) Membership and certification must be open.
(5) All parties with an interest in the standardization or certifica-
tion program must be accorded "due process," including timely hearings
respecting standards or denial of certifications.
(6) Validation of standards and certification of products must be
performed by independent laboratories.
(7) All standards must be voluntary.
The complexity of the criteria suggested by the Commission, and par-
ticularly the caution with respect to the necessity of fashioning appro-
priate procedures according "due process" and the stress on "voluntary"
compliance, raise some question as to whether the self-regulatory func-
tion as it may emerge from its study would not require a considerable
degree of governmental supervision, both with respect to development and
enforcement41 of programs. It remains to be seen whether, in the ab-
sence of new legislation conferring express regulatory authority, the Com-
mission will be willing and able to assert a guiding role over self-regulatory
programs.
Nevertheless, the Commission's view of the complexity of the legal
requirements for standardization programs should not be taken as casting
doubt on the immense amount of activity which proceeds in this area
without antitrust challenge, and often with the participation or encourage-
ment of the Department of Commerce 42 or other Governmental bodies.
In fact, Joseph Martin, Jr., general counsel of the Commission, has ob-
served that product standardization is lagging behind new inventions and
technology, and that the need for increased standardization is "acute." 48
D. Product safety
The fate of self-regulation becomes more doubtful when we turn
41 Chairman Kirkpatrick has subsequently suggested that self-regulatory bodies monitor
deceptive practices and refer them to the Government for enforcement action. N.Y. Times,
June 19, 1971, at 44, col. 3.
4 2 Kestenbaum, Antitrust Questions in Voluntary Industry Standards, 24 FooD DRUG COSM.
LJ. 606 (1969). In Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Association, 261 F. Supp.
154 (D. Ore. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), defendant's trade associa-
tion was held not to be liable for its refusal to alter a commercial standard for plywood established
under the procedures of the Department of Commerce. The injury caused to those producing
products which do not comply with such standards was referred to by the trial court as "con-
gressionally sanctioned." 261 F. Supp. at 159.
43 Federal Trade Commission News, June 24, 1971.
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from product certification to joint business action for the elimination of
unsafe products. Agreements to withhold products from the market are
a category of joint action not customarily tested under the "rule of reason."
While holding out the possibility of approving such action when the
question of safety is clear, the Antitrust Division has stressed the necessity
of satisfactory procedures to assure participation of all interested groups,
including consumers and Government, to assure that the elimination of
the product is justified. Moreover, Donald Turner, while he was head
of the Division, had cautioned that in some cases a consumer may prefer
a lower price to more safety and should not be deprived of the choice.44
It appears that the Nixon Administration will favor committing the protec-
tion of product safety to a mandatory Governmental regulatory scheme
rather than relying on self-regulation.45 This year a number of legislative
proposals relating to product safety have been introduced and publicly
debated with considerable heat.4" Under S. 1797, which was initially
supported by the Administration, identification of consumer product
risks, determination of safety standards and the banning of unsafe products
are entrusted to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The
bill authorizes the Secretary of HEW to adopt safety standards published
by any Federal agencies or other qualified organizations and to accept
offers from qualified persons to develop standards 4  Although these pro-
visions would permit industry participation in the setting of standards,
the Act does not grant any exemption from the antitrust laws for such
participation. Other legislative proposals would expressly disclaim any
intention to grant an antitrust exemption.48
E. Influencing governmental action
One of the few safe things we can say about the developing legal
field of consumerism and ecology is that the alternative to self-regulation
is regulation. Businessmen as well as social groups can be expected to
expend considerable energies in concerted attempts to deter actions by
legislatures and rule-making bodies which they consider unfavorable and
to shape emerging rules into the most palatable form. In 1971 it has be-
come plain that these legislative and administrative battles are well
4 4 Turner, Consumer Protection by Private Joint Action, 1967 N.Y. STATE B Ass'WN
AnTRsUT L. SY PosiuM 36, at 40.
45Past accomplishments of self-regulation in the area of product safety are rated very
low by the National Commission on Product Safety in its June, 1970, staff report on Industry
Self-Regulation.
46S. 1797, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (HEW proposal); S. 983 and H.R. 260 and 1569
(identical bills), 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (bill sponsored by National Commission on Product
Safety); H.R. 10835, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (compromise measure supported by the Ad-
ministration).
4 7 Supra note 46, S. 1797, § 6.
4 8 Supra note 46, S. 983, § 48; H.R. 10835, § 303(a).
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underway. An FTC rule requiring the posting of octane ratings on gaso-
line pumps was challenged by a lawsuit filed in March by a group of oil
refiners and marketers.4  Two large soap manufacturers challenged a
proposed FTC rule requiring detergent makers to list ingredients on
packages and to display pollution warnings in advertisements 0 In Akron
an ordinance banning phosphate detergents was stopped by a preliminary
injunction following a joint suit filed by the Soap and Detergent Associa-
tion and several of its members." In the state of Washington a joint lob-
bying campaign by the soft-drink manufacturers and brewers was successful
in inducing voters to reject narrowly an initiative banning use of no-return
or low-deposit bottles.12
Without passing on the merits of the positions taken in any of these
policy battles, it is obvious that many joint attacks by competitors on legal
developments may be motivated by anticompetitive purposes. Neverthe-
less, some comfort has been drawn from the line of cases beginning with
Noen and Penningtonr> which find immunity from antitrust liability for
joint actions taken to petition governmental authorities.
In the Noerr case, an anticompetitive motive was dearly alleged. It
was charged by 41 Pennsylvania truck operators and their trade associa-
tion that 24 eastern railroads, an association of their presidents, and a
public relations firm engaged by them had conducted a publicity campaign
designed to foster adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement
practices destructive of the trucking business. The Court held that the
Sherman Act did not prohibit two or more persons from associating to-
gether in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint
or a monopoly. The Court's decision rested on the propositions that the
question whether a law should pass or be enforced is the responsibility of
the appropriate legislative and executive branches, and that such responsi-
bility includes the power to take governmental action which may operate
to restrain trade. The Court also noted that a contrary interpretation of
the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions by inter-
fering with the right to petition.
The result in Noerr was not affected by the fact that the defendants
49 Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1971, at 5, col. 3.
50 Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1971, at col. 3. The suit was brought by Lever Brothers
Co. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. moved for permission to intervene. To the extent the Noerr
immunity discussed in this section may be interpreted narrowly, there may be less antitrust risk
in moving to intervene in a legal proceeding than in joining at the outset as a plaintiff-possibly
a new analogue to price following as opposed to price fixing!
51 Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1971, at 25, col. 5.
52504 BNA ANTrnusT AND TRADE REG. REP. E-1 (1971).
53 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 'Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
54 United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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had used in their campaign the so-called "third party technique" whereby
they arranged for their propaganda to emanate from supposedly inde-
pendent groups. The Court left to Congress the question of whether such
a delicate area of citizenship as the ethics of governmental campaigning
should be regulated.
In the Pennington case, the Court confirmed that the Noerr immunity
prevented the imposition of liability for joint petition of the Government
regardless of the existence of an anticompetitive purpose and even when
constituting a part of a larger course of concerted action. Moreover, the
Noerr immunity was applied to alleged joint labor-business action to influ-
ence administrative action, the setting of minimum wage rates for govern-
ment contractors under the Walsh-Healy Act.
However, the Noerr and Pennington cases left certain possible gaps
in the general immunity for joint action in relation to Governmental
bodies. In Noerr, the Court observed that "there may be some situations
in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing gov-
ernmental action, is a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relations of a competitor."5' Pennington noted another
exception: it would be within the province of the trial judge to admit evi-
dence of a combination to influence governmental action, if the evidence
is probative and not unduly prejudicial, for the purpose of showing the
purpose and character of other transactions under scrutiny as antitrust vio-
lations5 6
Recent cases and proceedings limiting Noerr-Pennington indicate that
the scope of immunity granted must be viewed with some caution. The
"sham" exception to Noerr seems to have been improperly invoked in
Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.,57 where opposition
to rivals' certification by the Public Utilities Commission of California
and the ICC without regard to the merits was considered to be "sham"
activity. However, the Court in Noerr did not invite an inquiry as to
whether a genuine attempt to influence governmental action was itself in
bad faith, but, instead, whether a lobbying effort was undertaken merely as
a pretext to disseminate publicity intended to interfere directly with
competitors' business relations. The Trucking Unlimited case also seems
in direct contravention of the view in Noerr that abuses of proper ethics
in recourse to governmental bodies are best treated by separate Congres-
sional enactment and not under the broad sweep of the Sherman Act.
If this aspect of Noerr is stressed, one can also question the correctness of
Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers
Local No. 150. 8 Here the court held that Noerr did not immunize the
55 365 U.S. at 144.
5 381 U.S. at 670, n. 3.
57432 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971).
58440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971).
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use of "illegal" means to influence Government action, it being alleged
that the defendants had through threats, duress and coercion induced the
California State Fair officials to issue a directive forbidding the sale of any
Coca-Cola upon fairgrounds during the 1966 State Fair. .But it may
be the teaching of Noerr that issues of illegality of methods used to obtain
governmental actions be determined under laws relating to lobbying,
obstruction of justice, and other aspects of communication between citizen
and government, and not under the basically economic regulations pro-
vided by the antitrust laws. Similar reservations may be expressed about
the decision in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America"° to the extent it holds Noerr inapplicable on the basis of
the falseness of information filed to induce favorable action by the
Texas Railroad Commission on the allocation of natural gas production
allowables. 0
However, an additional ground has been asserted in the above cases
to limit Noerr-Pennington-the view that the immunity extends only to
efforts to influence governmental action which involves policy-making
considerations. On this ground it was held in Whitten v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc.6" that the immunity did not apply to efforts by three affili-
ated swimming pool companies to induce local government authorities
acting under competitive bidding requirements to adopt exclusionary spec-
ifications proposed by the defendants. The absence of a policy making
function was also relied on in the Woods and Sacramento Coca-Cola
cases. In the Trucking Unlimited case, one of the grounds for the court's
holding that the Sherman Act reached the alleged conspiracy of trucking
firms to oppose without regard to the merits competitors' requests for
certification by the California Public Utilities Commission and the ICC
was the broad position that the rationale of Noerr-Pennington does not
require protecting the access of courts and agencies performing adjudicative
functions to information and opinion relevant to determinations of policy
which they have no power to make. This distinction between policy-mak-
59438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.), 40 U.S.L.W. 3012 (U.S. May 15, 1971) (No. 70-173).
00 The result in Woods appears to be contrary to that in Okefenokee Rural Electric Member-
ship Corp. v. Florida Power and Light Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954), where allegations
that false statements were made to induce governmental refusal to issue a highway permit failed
to sustain a Sherman Act claim.
The "sham, .... illegal means" or "evidentiary" loophole in Noerr-Pennington is apparently
utilized in the Federal securities fraud case recently filed against National Bankers Life Insurance
Co. in the Northern District of Texas, where it is alleged that the defendants attempted to avoid
further FDIC regulation of the banks involved in alleged market manipulations by attempting,
by making loans and stock profits available to governmental officials and employees, to have
legislation passed by the Texas legislature that would enable State banks to be insured by a
State chartered insurance company. Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Bankers
Life Insurance Co. et al., U.S. District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Div. (Civil Action No. CA-
3-4432-B), Complaint, para. 31. Permanent injunctions against Federal securities law viola-
tions have been entered in the case. Wall Street Journal September 17, 1971 at 12, col. 1.
01424 F.2d 25 (ist Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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ing and adjudication is a brave one, indeed, particularly if it were to be
applied to such multi-function agencies as the FTC.
Despite these limitations, the Noerr immunity in its shrinking heart-
land is very much alive and should have great significance in the battles
over environmental and consumer protection laws and regulations. This
Associate Professor William Rodgers of the University of Washington
learned from the FTC when it rejected, on the basis of the Noerr im-
munity, his request for investigation of a successful lobbying effort by
bottlers (including threats of price increases) against legislation requiring
deposit bottles in the State of Washington.62
F. Exempted "State" action
A final point should be made about the emerging struggle over the
role of antitrust regulation in the supervision of joint business action in
the interest of consumer protection and the war against pollution. From
many of the comments from the FTC, the Antitrust Division and other
Federal agencies on the merits or horrors of immunizing joint conduct
from the rigors of the Sherman Act, one might almost be ready to assume
that the debate is subject to resolution in a purely federal arena. This
is far from the case, as we are dearly told by Parker v. Brown63 and its
recent progeny. In Parker, the Supreme Court held that a raisin marketing
proration system which was administered by a committee of raisin growers
and marketers appointed and supervised by State authorities under the
California Agricultural Prorate Act was immune from antitrust attack
as "State action." The Court said that a State may not give immunity to
private persons who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to
violate it or declaring that their action is lawful. However, the Court held
that, although the organization of a prorate zone was proposed by pro-
ducers and a prorate program, approved by the state commission, must also
be approved by a referendum of producers, the State had made the mar-
keting program its own by creating the machinery of the program, adopting
the program, and enforcing the program through penal sanctions, in exe-
cution of a governmental policy to eliminate chaotic marketing conditions.
The Parker case has been so long with us that it now has an air of
inevitability which it does not deserve. Robert L. Stern, who argued
Parker for the Government, contended that the California marketing pro-
gram was inconsistent with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act against
monopolization, and that the Sherman Act superseded State legislation
conflicting with the policy it established. He argued further that the Cali-
fornia program was invalid under the commerce clause. Neither then
62 Wall Street journal, April 15, 1971, at 2, col. 4. Professor Rodgers made the interesting
suggestion that there wtuld have been antitrust liability had the initiative succeeded and the
threatened price increase been carried out.
63 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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nor since have these arguments carried the day, and neither Sherman
Act preemption nor the commerce clause has provided substantial ob-
stacles to State regulations having anticompetitive effects.
Parker has spawned a large family. Many cases have seen the Parker
immunity claim joined with claims under Noerr and Pennington, and
Noerr itself relied on the Parker decision. And one of the express rulings
of Pennington, solidly based on Parker, was that no recoverable damages
could be based on the governmental action of the Secretary of Labor in
fixing wage rates under Walsh-Healy. But Parker has not been a basis
for creating broad antitrust immunity for anticompetitive acts involving
indirect or passive participation by federal officials, in view of the strong
principle in the cases that implied antitrust exemptions will not lightly
be read into federal regulatory schemes. 4
The Parker line of cases dealing with anticompetitive action involving
State governments and officials is not fully consistent. The most restric-
tive view of Parker, as exemplified by Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade,
Inc. v. FTC,05 is that for the immunity to apply, the state must have "a
public policy against free competition in an industry important to it."
Consistent with this view, it was held in Paddock Pools66 that where the
state evinces a decision in favor of competition (in that case by adopting
competitive bidding regulations), restrictions on competition cannot be
attributed to State action.
Other restrictions which have been placed on Parker dosely parallel
limitations on the Noerr immunity, and many of the cases reach similar
conclusions as to the availability of each immunity. In Woods 7 the in-
ducement of state action by misleading the governmental body voided the
claim of the "State action" immunity. In several cases, including the
Continental Ore6" case decided by the Supreme Court, the distinction has
been drawn between policy-making decisions by officials and business
decisions by private delegates. Business decisions, and ministerial actions
by lower-level officials, may be insufficiently discretionary to reflect state
action and may be shown, in some cases, as in Continental, to be contrary
to State policy. 9
But the degree of State involvement necessary to invoke Parker re-
mains in doubt. Two decisions have immunized as State action privately
64 E.g., United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., supra 2.
1: 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cr. 1959).
66 Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., supra note 61.
67 Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Company of America, supra note 59.
(8 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
60 Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Company of America, supra note 59;
Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 150,
supra note 58; Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., supra note 61.
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set rates which have been approved by State rate regulatory bodies70 Con-
siderably beyond these decisions is the recent VEPCO case' which ap-
plies Parker immunity to an alleged tie-in arrangement involving installa-
tion of electrical service on the ground that the State regulatory commission
could have challenged the arrangement and failed to do so.
What will be the status under Parker of State programs to permit in-
dustry boards, under State supervision to eliminate unsafe products, agree
on pollution measures, or the like? This will be an interesting develop-
ment to watch. At this point, it may be sufficient to note the ironic
possibility posed by VEPCO that the States may be given broader authority
to whittle away at the sacred commands of the Sherman Act than federal
legislators and antitrust administrators are presently willing to concede to
themselves.72
70 Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3009 (U.S. June 16, 1971); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lan-
ier, 361 F. 2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966). But in Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444
F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971), it has been held that "state action" immunity does not apply to resale
prices filed under a mandatory price filing system where the governmental agency had no power
to review the prices.
7 1 Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
1971).
72 In Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., supra, note 2, at 90,331, a stricter standard is apparently
adopted for application of Parker to Federal regulatory schemes than to State programs, namely,
whether "Congress has knowingly adopted a policy contrary to or inconsistent with * * * the
antitrust laws." (Emphasis added). In November, 1971 Antitrust Division Chief McLaren
warned businessmen not to find in Phase II controls an implied license to fix prices. 537 BNA
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. E-1-E-3 (1971).
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